The significance of population monotonicity and welfare bounds is well-recognized in the fair division literature. We characterize population monotonic and incentive compatible mechanisms which allocate the goods efficiently and respect a welfare lower bound chosen in the fair allocation problem of allocating collectively owned indivisible goods or bads when monetary transfers are possible and preferences are private information. We consider the welfare bounds that are central to the fair allocation literature, namely, the identical-preferences lower-bound, individual rationality, the stand-alone lower-bound, and −fairness. We also compare the strength and associated budget deficits of and the logical relations between the aforementioned lower bounds. JEL Classifications: C79, D61, D63.
Introduction
One of the main distributive concerns of society is providing a safety net to its members. It is important for the functioning of a society that agents know their worst-case-scenario welfare levels. The minimal welfare guaranteed to the members of a society is generally an indicator of the level of solidarity and development of the society. Fairness also calls for the presence of welfare bounds that protect agents from factors for which they are not responsible, such as other agents' preferences or changes in population. We investigate welfare bounds in problems where population varies.
When a population varies, the resources may need to be reallocated. In doing so, two concerns could arise. First, since no agent is individually responsible for the population change, solidarity would call for the welfare levels of all agents in the initial population to change in the same direction (population monotonicity; Thomson, 1983) . Second, the center that allocates the resources may wish to ensure that the welfare bound it implemented in the initial economy is still respected in the new economy. We investigate whether these two goals are attainable simultaneously.
Population monotonicity is perhaps the most central axiom in the analysis of variable population models. This axiom has been analyzed in several problems such as bargaining theory, coalitional games, house allocation problems, as well as fair allocation problems in exchange economies; economies with single-peaked preferences, with public goods, with indivisible goods etc. (see Thomson, 1995a , for a survey). Population monotonicity is considered as a strong property frequently incompatible with efficiency and fairness criteria (see, for instance, Kim, 2003; Thomson, 1995b; Alkan, 1994; Tadenuma and Thomson, 1993) . Even if, population monotonic mechanisms that meet fairness criteria such as no-envy and egalitarian-equivalence 1 exist in some models, such mechanisms may still generate "socially unacceptable" low levels of welfare to some agents in some economies. Hence, an allocation that respects an equitable welfare lower bound may be preferable to a, say, envy-free allocation.
The so called "fair allocation problem" arises when agents have equal rights or responsibilities over the allocated resources, that is, the resources are collectively owned. The literature on fair allocation proposed welfare bounds which not only act as a safety net, but also embody equity notions. A common way to incorporate notions of fairness in the design of a welfare bound is by carrying out the following thought experiment: First, the society agrees on a basic set of fairness notions that should be applied in a hypothetical "reference economy". These fairness notions determine an allocation and associated welfare levels in this reference economy. Then, these welfare levels are taken as a benchmark for the actual economy.
Perhaps, the oldest equitable welfare lower bound is the one that guarantees the welfare at the equal split of resources. 2 In economies where indivisible goods and money are allocated, since equal division is not well defined, an alternative fairness axiom is the following: Pick an agent and consider a reference economy where all agents have preferences identical to hers. Find the common welfare level enjoyed at a Paretoefficient and envy-free allocation. Since each agent is only responsible for her own preference but not for the heterogeneity in the preferences in the actual economy, no agent should be worse off than she was in her reference economy (identical-preferences lower-bound, Moulin, 1990) . Other welfare lower bounds that are mostly studied in the fair allocation literature include individual rationality (respecting the status-quo), the stand-alone lower-bound (respecting the autonomy of agents), and −fairness (a welfare bound based on Rawlsian maxmin criterion, introduced by Porter, et al, 2004) . Except for −fairness, these welfare bounds guarantee each agent a welfare level that depends only on her own preference. Hence, under the veil of ignorance about other agents' preferences, each agent knows beforehand the minimal welfare level she would attain once others' preferences are revealed and the allocation is realized.
The above-mentioned welfare bounds can be applied both in the fixed and the variable population cases. When the population varies, another appealing way to design a welfare bound is by utilizing notions of solidarity, which in general, give rise to welfare bounds: consider economic factors for which no agent is individually responsible but which effect the welfare levels of all agents (e.g. population, resources etc.). If there is a change in such a factor, then by solidarity, the welfare levels in the initial economy should be bounds on welfare in the new economy after the change. In our model, an increase in population is good news; hence, population monotonicity requires the welfares in the initial economy to be lower bounds on the welfares of the initial agents in the larger population.
Compatibility of population monotonicity with welfare bounds is not always guaranteed. For instance, when agents share a single, divisible, non-disposable task over which they have single-peaked preferences, population monotonicity is incompatible with the equal-split welfare lower bound (Thomson, 1995b) . We investigate its compatibility with each of the aforementioned welfare lower bounds in a model where a central authority needs to assign heterogenous indivisible goods or bads (tasks) among a finite set of agents when monetary transfers are allowed and agents have quasilinear preferences. Each agent can be assigned multiple objects but each object is assigned to exactly one agent. Some examples are auctions held to allocate water entitlements to farmers, imposition of tasks as in government requisitions and eminent domain proceedings, and the siting problem of discrete public goods or bads 3 such as choosing the locations of desirable facilities or events (Olympics events, parks, international airports, etc.) or noxious facilities (waste disposal sites, nuclear facilities etc.), also called as the "not-in-my-backyard, NIMBY" problem. 4 Without loss of generality, 1 No-envy (Foley, 1967) requires that no agent prefers another agent's bundle to her own. Egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978) requires that each agent is indifferent between her bundle and a common reference bundle. In Yengin (2011c) , we show the existence of population monotonic selections from Groves mechanisms that satisfy no-envy and egalitarianequivalence. See also Yengin (2010) .
2 See for example Steinhaus, 1948; Dubins and Spanier, 1961; and Moulin, 1991. 3 Assume that there is no question of whether or how much of the public good is to be provided and the only question is which locality will provide what public good and what the compensations are. See Yengin (2011a) . 4 Other examples include the following allocation problems: social services to the members of society (e.g. municipality child-we consider the assignment of tasks. Unlike most of the previous studies on the compatibility of population monotonicity with welfare bounds, we analyze the case where agents' preferences are their private information; hence, an incentive compatibility requirement is needed in order to ensure that the allocations are efficient and respect welfare bounds with respect to the true preferences. We restrict our attention to the class of mechanisms that are strategyproof (truthful reporting of preference is a weakly dominant strategy for all agents) and assign the objects efficiently (assignment-efficient).
After we introduce preliminaries in Section 2, we present our main result in Section 3 where we analyze the problem of allocating a single object as is the case in most NIMBY problems (for example, determining which locality hosts a nuclear facility). As is well known, assignment-efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms do not balance the budget (total monetary transfer does not add up to zero in each economy). Hence, an important goal for the center is to pick a mechanism that generates the minimal possible deficit in each economy. For each of the aforementioned welfare lower bounds, our main result, Theorem 1, presents the characterizations of mechanisms that minimize the budget deficit in each economy among all assignmentefficient, strategy-proof, and population monotonic ones respecting the welfare bound.
When the center is choosing a specific welfare bound to implement, several factors need to be considered: the choice of the welfare bound significantly effects not only the welfare levels attained by the agents, but also the budget deficit generated, and the simplicity of the transfer functions. Theorem 1 demonstrates, under population monotonicity, how the complexity of the transfers change as the center changes the imposed welfare lower bound. In Section 4, we extend our focus to the general case of allocating multiple objects. Results in Section 4.1 demonstrate that under the deficit minimization condition, for each of the aforementioned welfare bounds except for the stand-alone lower-bound, additionally imposing population monotonicity significantly narrows down the class of admissible mechanisms, raises the complexity of the transfer functions while increasing the guaranteed welfare levels as well as the minimal deficits in each economy.
Although, the mechanisms we consider do not balance the budget, we can design ones that generate bounded deficits. In Section 4.2, we present upper bounds on deficit which together with appropriate welfare lower bounds characterize particular subclasses of the assignment-efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms.
In Section 4.3, we analyze the relative strength of welfare bounds and the logical relations between them. When selecting a stronger welfare lower bound over a weaker one, the center has to consider the trade off between the increase in total welfare and the increase in total deficit. In Section 4.4.1, among different pairs of welfare lower bounds, we compare the increase in minimal deficit and total welfare when the bound is strengthened. We also present upper and lower bounds on this increase. In Section 4.4.2, we analyze the increase in minimal deficit and total welfare when population monotonicity is imposed on a mechanism that respects a given welfare lower bound . Section 5 Concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Model
There is an infinite set of "potential" agents indexed by the positive natural numbers N ≡ {1 2 }. In any given problem, only a finite number of them are present. Let N be the set of subsets of potential agents with at least two agents. Let  ≥ 2 and  with | | =  be a typical element of N . The number of agents in a given problem may be smaller than, equal to, or greater than the number of tasks.
Let 2 A be the set of subsets of A. Each agent  has a cost function   : 2 A → R + with   (∅) = 0. 5 We refer to such a cost function as unrestricted. Let C  be the set of all such functions.
If for each
If for each pair {  0 } ⊆ 2 A with care), community housing, charitable goods and money among the needy, fishing or pollution permits, resources in centrally planned economies, commonly owned indivisible goods in cooperative enterprises such as cooperative supported agriculture, inheritance among heirs, landing rights to airlines, job and wage assignments etc. 5 As usual, R+ denotes the set of non-negative real numbers.
Let C   C   and C sup be the classes of additive, subadditive, and superadditive cost functions, respectively. Let C be a generic element of {C   C   C   C sup } and C  be the −fold Cartesian product of C
where for each  ∈ N   ∈ C. A cost profile defines an economy. Let   0  b  be typical economies with associated agent sets   0  b  For each  ∈ N and each  ∈  let  − be the cost profile of the agents in \{} For each pair {  0 } ⊂ N such that  0 ⊆  and each  ∈ C   let   0 be the restriction of  to  0 :
be the -th cost in the ascending order of the costs in
There is a perfectly divisible good we call "money". Let   denote agent  0 s consumption of the good. We call   agent  0  transfer : if    0 it is a transfer from the center to ; if    0 |  | is a transfer from  to the center.
We think of a "center " that assigns the tasks and determines each agent's transfer. Agent 's utility when she is assigned the set of tasks   ∈ 2 A (note that   may be empty) and consumes   ∈ R is
∈ is an assignment and (  ) ∈ is a transfer profile for  A mechanism is a function  ≡ ( ) defined over the union S ∈N C  that associates with each economy
be the minimal total cost generated among all possible distributions of  to the agents in  . That is,
Since an agent's transfer and total transfer can be of any size, every allocation is Pareto-dominated by some other allocation with higher transfers. Thus, there is no Pareto-efficient allocation in our model. However, we can define a notion of efficiency restricted to the assignment of the tasks. Since utilities are quasi-linear, given any economy  an allocation that minimizes total cost is Pareto-efficient for  among all allocations with the same, or smaller, total transfer. Our first axiom requires mechanisms to choose only such allocations.
Since costs are private information, an assignment-efficient mechanism assigns the tasks so that the actual total cost is minimal only if the agents report their true costs. Truthful reporting is also essential to determine the correct welfare bounds. Then, a desirable property for a mechanism is that no agent should ever benefit by misrepresenting her costs (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) . 6 All ties are taken into account in this order. For instance, if there are two agents whose costs are the lowest, then  Holmström, 1979 , since for each  ∈ N  C  is convex). The Groves mechanisms were introduced by Vickrey (1961) , Clarke (1971) , and Groves (1973) . A Groves mechanism chooses, for each economy, an efficient assignment of the tasks. We work with single-valued Groves mechanisms and assume that each Groves mechanism is associated with a tie-breaking rule that determines which of the efficient assignments (if there are more than one) is chosen. Let T be the set of all possible tie-breaking rules and  be a typical element of this set.
For each  ∈ N let   be a real-valued function defined over the union S ∈N C  such that for each  ∈ N with  ∈  and each  ∈ C     depends only on  −  Let  = (  ) ∈N and H be the set of all such 
The Groves mechanism associated with  ∈ H and  ∈ T , G  :
The transfer of each agent determined by a Groves mechanism has two parts. First, each agent pays the total cost incurred by all other agents at the assignment chosen by the mechanism. Second, each agent receives a constant sum of money that does not depend on her own cost.
Note that for each  ∈ H the mechanisms in {  }  ∈T are Pareto-indifferent 8 since for each  ∈ N , each  ∈  , and each
By Green and Laffont (1977) , no assignment-efficient and strategy-proof mechanism balances the budget. In Section 4.2, we investigate the effects of imposing upper bounds on the budget deficit (i.e. total transfer). In Section 4.4, we make a comparative analysis of the amount of deficits generated by the different classes of Groves mechanisms we study in this paper.
Welfare Bounds and the Main Result
Suppose new agents join some initial population. The cost of an efficient assignment in the larger population is at most as large as the one in the smaller population 9 , which is good news for the society. Since none of the agents in the initial population is responsible for the population growth, all of them should be at least as well off in the larger population as in the smaller one (Thomson, 1983) . Hence, for the initially existing agents, their welfare levels in the smaller population are taken as lower bounds on their welfares in the larger population.
See Thomson (2005) for an extensive survey on strategy-proofness. 
The new agents may have lower costs than the existing ones and a reallocation of tasks could lower the total cost of an efficient assignment. At the worst case scenario, the initial allocation of tasks is kept and the total cost does not change. Lemma 1. A Groves mechanism   is population monotonic if and only if for each pair
If participation is voluntary, then a natural requirement from a mechanism is to ensure that no agent experiences a welfare that is less than her status quo welfare when she didn't participate. Even if participation may not be voluntary, as in eminent domain proceedings, the center may still wish to ensure that agents have non-negative utilities.
Individual Rationality (IR): For each  ∈ N , each  ∈  and each  ∈ C  ,
Although individual rationality is desirable in many cases, it may not be required in situations where agents are collectively responsible for the associated costs of assigned tasks. As an example, in times of a war or national emergency, the government can requisition the goods or services of the people without fully compensating their costs and agents may end up with negative utilities. A fair distribution of costs among agents would lead to utility levels below status quo. Nevertheless, society would still be concerned with the equity of the distribution of welfare and guaranteeing a safety net to agents. Hence, welfare lower bounds which are weaker than individual rationality would be required.
One such welfare lower bound is the one that respects agents' autonomy. Imagine, there is only one agent in the society. Since she is the only one who is responsible for the completion of all tasks, she should bear all the cost. However, it would be unfair to tax this agent. Call her utility in this reference economy as her stand-alone utility. (For instance, in the NIMBY problem, this utility is the welfare when each locality autonomously builds its own facility.) In the actual economy, since all agents are collectively responsible for the total cost of the tasks, no agent should end up worse than her stand-alone utility where she bore all the costs alone.
The Stand-Alone Lower-Bound (SALB) 10 : For each  ∈ N , each  ∈  and each  ∈ C  ,
all agents have the same preference 11 , fairness would require that they all experience the same welfare (fairness notions such as no-envy, anonymity, or equal treatment of equals would imply this result). Hence, under assignment-efficiency and budget-balance, each agent's utility would be −
 Since, no agent is responsible for the preferences of the others, in the actual economy where preferences are heterogenous, no one should be worse than she is in her reference economy.
Let  ∈ N ,  ∈  , and  ∈ C   In exchange economies, variety in preferences is typically good news: exchange among agents who have different preferences benefit both parties of the trade. However, in the problem we study, the following example illustrates that the heterogeneity in preferences may be good or bad news for agent  since the cost of an efficient assignment in the actual economy  ∈ C  may be greater or smaller than the one in her reference economy
One may argue that it is fair for agent  to benefit from the heterogeneity in preferences in the actual economy whenever it is good news. The following weakening of the identical-preferences lower-bound represents this idea. 12
Conditional Identical-Preferences Lower-Bound (CIPLB): For each  ∈ N  each  ∈  and each
Consider an economy with  agents. Suppose there is a single task, say . Rawls' difference principle, also known as the maximin criterion requires that agents experience equal utilities unless it is possible to have a Pareto improvement on the equal utility distribution. If one requires that the center incurs no-deficit (total transfer is at most zero), then the maximin criterion implies an allocation that is assignment-efficient, budget-balanced, and egalitarian and the utility of each agent is
. Unfortunately, there is no strategyproof mechanism which requires the utility achieved at such an allocation to be a welfare lower-bound (1−fairness) and generates no-deficit (see Corollary 1 of Porter et. al., 2004) . To obtain no deficit, we can reduce the lower bound on the utilities: for each  ≥  ≥ 1, consider the hypothetical economy where the task is assigned to an agent with the -th lowest cost and utilities are equalized through transfers that balance the budget. The resulting utility of each agent is
. Let this reference utility be a lower bound on the actual utilities (−fairness). 13 Porter et. al. (2004) generalize this bound to the multiple-task setting by requiring
to be a welfare lower bound (this generalization may be most appealing on the additive domain). When the population varies, any given  will be greater than the number of people in some populations. Hence, for each  ≥ 1 we generalize −fairness to a variable population setting, by requiring that in each −agent economy, the common reference utility is determined by assigning each task to an agent with the -th lowest cost to perform that task where  = min{ }.
Population monotonicity can be incompatible with fairness notions and welfare bounds in other models (see, for instance, Thomson, 1995b) . Fortunately, this is not the case for our model on any domain of cost functions, as the following result demonstrates:
then, on any domain, the Groves mechanism   satisfies population monotonicity, individual rationality, the identical-preferences lower-bound, the stand-alone lower-bound, and −fairness for  ≥ 1. ♦ 12 Symmetrically, we can also formulate a welfare upper bound which requires that an agent  does not gain when the heterogeneity in preferences is bad news for her, that is,  ( A) ≥  (   A) A Groves mechanism   respects this welfare upper bound if and only if for each  ∈ N , each  ∈ , and each  ∈ C     ( − ) ≤ 0 13 Note that no deficit is compatible with −fairness for  ≥ 3; and for each  ≥ 1 if a mechanism is −fair, then it is ( + 1)−fair as well.
It is easy to show the following: a Groves mechanism   satisfies population monotonicity and the stand-alone lower-bound if and only if for each pair
Unfortunately, if we strengthen the welfare bound to individual rationality, the identical-preferences lower-bound, or  − , then the  functions associated with a population monotonic Groves mechanism do not have compact formula unless we restrict our attention to the single-task case. Our main result next presents our characterizations for this case.
Theorem 1:
Consider the single-task case. Without loss of generality, let A = {} (a) A Groves mechanism   generates the minimal deficit in each economy among all Groves mechanisms that satisfy population monotonicity and individual rationality if and only if for each  ∈ N  each  ∈  , and each
(b) A Groves mechanism   generates the minimal deficit in each economy among all Groves mechanisms that satisfy population monotonicity and the stand-alone lower-bound if and only if for each  ∈ N  each  ∈  , and each
(c) A Groves mechanism   generates the minimal deficit in each economy among all Groves mechanisms that satisfy population monotonicity and the identical-preferences lower-bound (or conditional identicalpreferences lower-bound or 1−fairness) if and only if for each  ∈ N  each  ∈  , and each
A Groves mechanism   generates the minimal deficit in each economy among all Groves mechanisms that satisfy population monotonicity and −fairness if and only if for each  ∈ N  each  ∈  , and each
Note that Theorem 1b holds even in the multiple-tasks case and on any domain. Several real life problems are concerned about the choice of the location of a single discrete public good or bad such as determining in which locality to build a nuclear facility. Allocation of a single task in a team of employees, choice of a representative or committee chair in an organization, provision of a multi-attribute public good 14 , and allocation of a single estate among heirs are some of the other examples where Theorem 1 would provide useful suggestions.
In Theorem 1, suppose we drop the requirement of generating minimal-deficit. Without loss of generality, consider individual rationality. Then, a Groves mechanism   is population monotonic and individually rational if and only if Lemma 1 holds and for each  ∈ N  each  ∈  , and each  ∈ C     ( − ) is weakly greater than the right-hand-side of the equation (4). This argument applies to the other parts of Theorem 1 as well. Hence, if we drop the deficit minimization requirement, then the agents would enjoy weakly higher utilities in each economy. 15 14 See Section 4 in Atlamaz and Yengin (2008) . 15 For instance, consider    such that for each  ∈ N  each  ∈ , and each
 is population monotonic and individually rational. The increase in deficit and total welfare when    is used instead of a mechanism as in Theorem 1a is
4 Further Results
Restrictiveness of Population Monotonicity
If the population was fixed, then the center would simply choose a welfare bound to apply in any given economy. When the population varies, the same chosen welfare bound can be applied in the new population; however, that would not guarantee that the welfares of all the initial agents are effected in the same direction. Thus, to maintain fairness, population monotonicity should be also satisfied. This is possible due to Theorem 1. To see how much bite population monotonicity has in conjunction with welfare bounds, we need to compare Theorem 1 with the following result.
Note that only Lemma 2d is an entirely new result. Part (a) is similar to Proposition 3 in Pápai (2003) ; parts (b) and (c) are by Yengin (2011b) and Yengin (2011a) , respectively; and part (e) is implied by the proof of Theorem 1 in Atlamaz and Yengin (2008) adapted to the variable population setting.
Lemma 2.
Let   be an assignment-efficient and strategy-proof mechanism (i.e., a Groves mechanism). (a) On any domain,   is individually rational if and only if for each  ∈ N , each  ∈  , and each
(b) On any domain,   respects the stand-alone lower-bound if and only if for each  ∈ N , each  ∈  , and each
(c) On the unrestricted domain,   respects the identical-preferences lower-bound if and only if for each
C     respects the identical-preferences lower-bound if and only if for each  ∈ N , each  ∈  and each  ∈ C  ,
C     respects the conditional identical-preferences lowerbound if and only if for each  ∈ N , each  ∈  , and each  ∈ C  ,
(e) On the additive domain,   is −fair if and only if for each  ∈ N , each  ∈  , and each
Let us denote the class of Groves mechanisms satisfying axiom "" as G   For each axiom  let     be a Groves mechanism that generates the minimal deficit in each economy among all mechanisms in G   Then, for each welfare bound  in Lemma 2,     is characterized by the inequality presented in the relevant part of Lemma 2 holding as an equality. For instance, a Groves mechanism generates the minimal deficit in each economy among all individually rational Groves mechanisms if and only if (8) holds as an equality in each economy: the resulting mechanism     is a Pivotal mechanism.
When the deficit is minimized, it is possible to provide an intuitive interpretation of the Groves mechanisms respecting a welfare lower bound; for instance, Pivotal mechanisms grant each agent a utility equal to her externality (for the intuitive interpretation for      , see Section 4 in Yengin, 2011a) . On the other hand, such interpretations are hard to come up with for the transfers specified in Theorem 1.
Note that the characterizations on the additive domain apply to the single-task case as well. Comparison of Theorem 1 with Lemma 2 shows that, under the deficit minimization condition, for each welfare lower bound X additionally imposing population monotonicity modifies the form of the transfer functions of Groves mechanisms     considerably and constrict the class G  . 16 Comparison of Theorem 1 with Lemma 2 yields the following observations: (4) and (8), the minimal welfare levels and the minimal deficit generated in each economy among all mechanisms in G   ∩ G  are weakly higher than the minimal welfare levels and deficit generated in G  . (See Section 4.4.2 for a detailed analysis).
The above observation still holds if we replace individual rationality with the (conditional) identicalpreferences lower-bound or −fairness. To see this, when there is a single-task, for each  ∈ N , each  ∈  and each  ∈ C   the right-hand-side of inequalities (11), (12), and (14) are equal to
which is weakly smaller than the right-hand-side of (6); and the right-hand-side of (7) is weakly greater than the right-hand-side of (13) and equal to it for  =  On the other hand, for the stand-alone lower-bound, even though G   ∩ G  is a strict subclass of G   for any number of tasks and on any domain, the minimal welfare levels and the minimal amount of deficit generated in each economy among all mechanisms in G   ∩ G  is the same as the ones generated among all mechanisms in G  due to (5) and (9).
Welfare Lower Bounds and Deficit Upper Bounds
Although, no Groves mechanism balances the budget, fortunately, we can design ones that respect an upper bound on total transfer (budget deficit). Hence, the center would know the maximal deficit it could incur in each economy when it uses such a mechanism. In particular, we can require a mechanism to generate no-deficit: for each  ∈ N and each  ∈ C  , P
By Theorem 2 in Yengin (2011b), a Groves mechanism   satisfies the stand-alone lower-bound and no-deficit if and only if for each  ∈ N  each  ∈  and each  ∈      ( − ) = 0 By Theorem 1b and Lemma 2b, such mechanisms are also the ones that generate the minimal deficit in each economy among all (population monotonic) Groves mechanisms that respect the stand-alone lower-bound. Hence, even under population monotonicity, the stand-alone lower-bound is compatible with no-deficit.
It is easy to see that there are economies for which the right-hand-sides of inequalities (8), (10), (11), and (12) are strictly positive. Hence, by (5) 17 , if a Groves mechanism respects individual rationality, or the (conditional) identical-preferences lower-bound 18 , then it violates no-deficit. This incompatibility with no-deficit remains if we impose population monotonicity since among Groves mechanisms that respect a given welfare lower bound, the population monotonic ones generate weakly higher deficits. Consequently, the mechanisms in Theorem 1 (a) and (c) generate non-negative deficits.
On the additive domain, by Atlamaz and Yengin (2008) , for  ∈ {1 2} −fair Groves mechanisms violate no-deficit, but if a Groves mechanism is −fair for  ≥ 3 then it generates no-deficit. Example 2 in Section 4.4.2 demonstrates that for  = 3 mechanisms in G   ∩ G − violate no-deficit. It is an open question whether there are   3 such that no-deficit would be satisfied by some mechanisms in G   ∩ G −  16 Note that adding population monotonicity would only effect the transfer functions when   2 17 Note that by Tables 2 and 3 in Section 4.3, SALB is weaker than IR and IPLB, and on the additive, the subadditive, or the unrestricted domain, it is weaker than CIPLB.
18 On either the additive, the subadditive, or the unrestricted domain.
In general, we can impose a deficit upper bound that may depend on the economy. Let  :
A mechanism  ≡ ( ) satisfies −bounded-deficit if and only if for each  ∈ N and each  ∈ C  , P ∈   () ≤ () As we saw in Lemma 2, welfare lower bounds only characterize the minimal amounts of transfers, not the exact amounts. On the other hand, we can pin down the exact amounts of the transfers of Groves mechanisms if we impose appropriate deficit-upper-bounds in conjunction with welfare lower bounds.
For each welfare lower bound X, mechanisms in {    }  ∈T generate the minimal deficit and the minimal welfare levels in each economy among all mechanisms in G   Suppose the center is willing to accept an increase in the deficit in each economy  over the one generated by     :
 By allowing such an increase in the deficit in each economy, can we reach higher welfare levels compared to the ones generated by     ? Due to strategy-proofness, the answer is negative if the acceptable increase in the deficit in each economy  is () for some  ∈ Θ that is, either a multiple of the cost of an efficient assignment or a multiple of the sum over all tasks of the difference between the -th and ( − 1)−th minimal cost for each task. This fact provides a way of characterizing the class {    }  ∈T (Table 1i , iv).
There are other types of deficit upper bounds that pin down Groves mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds: For each  ∈ N and each  ∈ C  , by Atlamaz and Yengin (2008) , the mechanisms that generate the minimal deficit among all −fair Groves mechanisms, generate deficits that are bounded above by (Table 1iii ). For min{ } ≥ 4 this difference is non-positive and the mechanisms in Table 1iii generate surpluses bounded below by Atlamaz and Yengin (2008) , and (iii) implies (ii).
Welfare lower bounds Deficit upper bounds
Groves mechanisms characterized (8) holds as an equality.
(ii) IPLB/CIPLB/1−fair
holds as an equality.
holds as an equality. Suppose we impose on an individually rational Groves mechanism a deficit upper bound equal to say,
 or simply allow a deficit up to only the second minimal cost  
[2]  In all these cases, we characterize the Pivotal mechanisms. Similarly, within G   if in each economy, we allow for a deficit up to a positive multiple of the total cost, or guarantee a surplus of at least the total cost, then we end up with the mechanisms as in (5) that actually generate no-deficit.
Using a parallel proof technique to the proof of Table 1i , we can show that the mechanisms in Theorem 1a can also be characterized as follows:
A Groves mechanism is population monotonic, individually rational, and satisfies either  0 −bounded deficit or   −bounded deficit if and only if it is as in Theorem 1a.
Some examples of the upper bound on deficit in Proposition 2 are
Due to the complexity of the transfer functions in Theorem 1 (c) and (d), we do not have parallel characterizations for these mechanisms using deficit upper bounds.
Logical Relations Between the Welfare Bounds
Even without requiring population monotonicity, all the welfare lower bounds we considered are still compatible, since on any domain, the Pivotal mechanisms respect each of them but violate population monotonicity. To see this, let  ≥ 1 By equation (1), for each  ∈ N  each  ∈  and each  ∈ C   (
In general, on any domain, the identical-preferences lower-bound is weaker than individual rationality and stronger than the stand-alone lower-bound and the conditional identical-preferences lower-bound. This relation is true even without the imposition of assignment-efficiency and strategy-proofness. Similarly, in general, individual rationality implies −fairness. Note that strengthening a welfare lower bound does not necessarily increase the complexity of the transfer functions as Theorem 1 and Lemma 2 demonstrate: Although, the identical-preferences lower-bound is weaker than individual rationality and stronger than the stand-alone lower-bound, the form of the transfer functions in Theorem 1c are more complex than the ones in Theorem 1 (a) and (b). Without assignment-efficiency and strategy-proofness, the lower bounds on welfare imposed by the identical-preferences lower-bound (or CIPLB) can be smaller or greater than the ones imposed by −fairness depending on the economy and the domain. The same argument applies to −fairness and the stand-alone lower-bound; hence, in general, they are not logically related. Also, there is no logical relation between the conditional identical-preferences lower-bound and the stand-alone lower-bound since the former does not impose a lower bound on welfare in economies  where
Under assignment-efficiency and strategy-proofness, not only the logical relations presented in Table 2 are preserved, but also other relations are revealed. For instance, even though the identical-preferences lower-bound and −fairness stem from different intuitions and fairness ideas and in general, are not logically related, the classes of mechanisms characterized in Theorem 1 (c) and (d) are identical for  = 2 Furthermore, Lemma 2 implies the following: 19 Certain logical relations hold under domain restrictions: On the additive or the subadditive domain, CIPLB is equivalent to IPLB. To see this, let C ∈ {C   C  } For each  ∈ N , each  ∈  and each
in all economies, CIPLB applies the same welfare lower bound as IPLB in each economy. Also, on the additive domain, 1−fairness implies IPLB since for each  ∈ N , each  ∈  and each
 It is easy to construct examples to show that these results do not hold on other domains and for   1 Remark 1. On the additive domain, under assignment-efficiency and strategy-proofness, the following are equivalent: the identical-preferences lower-bound, the conditional identical-preferences lower-bound, 1−fairness, and 2−fairness.
Remark 1 presents an interesting result: for Groves mechanisms, requiring that each agent 's utility is no less than the common utility at a Pareto-efficient and egalitarian allocation in 's reference economy   (i.e. IPLB) is equivalent to requiring that each agent's utility is no less than the common utility at a Pareto-efficient and egalitarian allocation at the actual economy  (1−fairness). Table 3 presents, for Groves mechanisms, the logical relations that exist between different welfare lower bounds on different domains. By Table 2 and Table 3i , on the additive domain, if a Groves mechanism is −fair for  ∈ {1 2}, then it respects the stand-alone lower-bound. For   2 there is no inclusion relationship between G  and G −  20 Table 3ii is not an "if and only if" statement. Porter et. al. (2004) introduced and Atlamaz and Yengin (2008) characterized a new class of Groves mechanisms that are parameterized by  ≥ 2 On any domain, these mechanisms are −fair, for each  ≥ 2. However, for   2 these mechanisms violate the identical-preferences lower-bound on each of the domains we consider in this paper. For  ∈ {1 2} they violate the identical-preferences lower-bound on the unrestricted, or the subadditive, or the superadditive domain. Table 4 is based on Tables 2 and 3 and summarizes the relations between classes of Groves mechanisms that respect different welfare lower bounds. It is not so obvious whether the same logical relations presented in Tables 2 and 3 are preserved under population monotonicity. When there is a single-task, by Theorem 1, the answer is affirmative. To see this, note the following two facts:
(i) If a population monotonic Groves mechanism respects a given welfare lower bound, then it generates welfare levels that are at least as much as the ones generated by a mechanism characterized in the relevant part of Theorem 1.
(ii) For each  ∈ N , each  ∈  and each  ∈ C  , equality (4) is weakly greater than (6); and (6) is weakly greater than (5) since
Hence, under population monotonicity, assignment-efficiency, and strategy-proofness, by facts (i) and (ii), individual rationality implies the identical-preferences lower-bound, which in turn implies the stand-alone lower-bound. For Table 3i , note that for  = 2 (6) is identical to (7).
Budget Deficits 4.4.1 Deficits generated under different welfare bounds
Our goal in this paper is not to analyze by how much the budget deficit performance of a Groves mechanism would deteriorate if you strengthen the welfare lower bound. Before one can carry out in depth budget performance analysis, this paper provides the necessary first step of study, by presenting for each welfare bound, the population monotonic Groves mechanisms that would generate the minimal budget deficit; and by studying the logical relations between different classes. That being said, let us present some remarks about the deficits generated by the classes presented in Table 1 .
(11) holds as an equality
(iv) SALB (9) holds as an equality can be arbitrarily high; hence, there is no fixed amount  ∈ R such that the deficits generated by mechanisms in Table 5 (i) and (ii) never exceeds this amount in each economy. On the other hand, deficits generated by mechanisms in Table 5iv and for  ≥ 3 in Table 5iii are bounded above by  = 0. 21 In each economy, the deficit generated by mechanisms in Table 5i is the highest, Table 5iv is the lowest, and Table 5ii is in between the other two (this result also generalizes to the multiple-tasks case due to Lemma 2). When there is a single task, by (15), an analogous comparison of deficits is also true under population monotonicity: in each economy, the deficit generated by mechanisms in Theorem 1a is the highest, Theorem 1b is the lowest, and Theorem 1c is in between. Hence, our results confirm the usual trade-off between equity and efficiency: as the lower bound on welfare gets stronger (hence the welfares guaranteed become higher), the minimal possible deficit incurred by the center gets larger.
Note that as  rises, the lower bound on welfares imposed by −fairness falls, and the minimal deficit generated also falls. Since for  = 2 the mechanisms in Theorem 1 (c) and (d) are identical, when there is a single task, for   2 in each economy, the minimal deficit generated among all population monotonic and −fair Groves mechanisms is weakly lower than the one generated among all population monotonic Groves mechanisms that respect the identical-preferences lower-bound. On the additive domain, this result still holds when we drop population monotonicity due to the fact that for  = 2 (11) is same as (13). That is, in each economy, the deficit generated by mechanisms in Table 5iii is weakly lower than the deficit generated by the mechanisms in Table 5ii .
Next, we investigate the amount of the increase in the minimal deficit and total welfare, when a welfare lower bound is strengthened. Such an analysis presents the trade-off the center would face when considering which welfare bound to implement.
Let            and     be as in Table 5 (i), (ii), and (iv), respectively. For each  ∈ N and each  ∈ C  , let ∆ − 0 () be the increase in deficit in economy  when the center strengthens the welfare bound respected by a Groves mechanism from X' to X while still minimizing the deficit in each economy. For instance,
is the increase in deficit when one adapts a Pivotal mechanism rather than a mechanism as in Table 5ii . Then, for each  ∈ N and each  ∈ C  ,
Since there is no upper bound on the cost functions,
can be arbitrarily high, so there is no fixed number  ∈ R which will bound ∆ −  () or ∆  − () from above. However, since (16), the increase in deficit can not exceed the second minimal cost when the center strengthens IPLB to IR while minimizing the deficit in each economy. On the other hand, in an economy where
 A parallel observation is true for ∆  − () as well. All together, for each  ∈ N and each  ∈ C  ,
 the increase in the minimal deficit generated by a Groves mechanism when −fairness is strengthened to ( − 1)−fairness is bounded above by
Since there is no restriction on the difference between any two cost functions, there is no  ∈ R that will bound this increase from above in each economy.
Note that by (16) and (17), for each  ∈ N and each  ∈ C  ,
That is, the increase in deficit when SALB is strengthened to IPLB is ( − 1) times the increase in deficit when IPLB is strengthened to IR. This observation is actually true for the multiple objects case as well: on any domain, for each  ∈ N and each  ∈ C  , ∆ −  () =
For each welfare bound X by (1), the total welfare generated by
By (20), if the center strengthens a welfare lower bound X' to X while minimizing deficit in each economy, the total welfare generated by the Groves mechanism increases by the same amount that the deficit increases since
By (18) and (21), under the deficit-minimization condition, the gain in total welfare when IPLB is strengthened to IR is between the minimal and the second minimal cost.
Deficits generated with and without population-monotonicity
Let A = {} When we switch from a Pivotal mechanism to a mechanism as in Theorem 1a, for each  ∈ N and each  ∈ C   the increase in total welfare as well as in total deficit is P
Note that there is no upper bound on the cost functions and no restriction on the difference between any two cost functions. Hence, for a welfare bound X among IR, IPLB, and −fairness, by Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, in each economy, the difference between the minimal deficit generated among all mechanisms in G   ∩ G  and the one generated among all mechanisms in G  can be arbitrarily high and is not bounded above by any fixed amount  ∈ R. The following example illustrates this point.
Example 2. Let  = {1 2 3} and  ∈ C  be such that   1 =   2 = 6 and   3 = 6 + 2 for   0 a) Let      be a mechanism as in Theorem 1a and     be a Pivotal mechanism. Then, for each
b) Let       be a mechanism as in Theorem 1c and      be a mechanism as in Table 1ii . Then,
c) Let  = 3   −   be as in Theorem 1d and   −  be as in Table 1iii .
In each part of Example 2, as  rises, the increase in the minimal deficit when population monotonicity is imposed also rises (note that there is no upper bound  ∈ R on ). Also, note that in Example 2c, if 3 23 Similar to (16) and (17), we can also see that for population monotonic Groves mechanisms, strengthening the welfare lower bound causes the minimal deficit generated in each economy to rise by an arbitrarily high amount unbounded by any  ∈ R. For instance, in Example 2, if   1 this increase in deficit is 10 + 2 when the center strengthens SALB to IPLB; and it is 8 + 2 when IPLB is strengthened to IR. Note that 8+2  6 and 10 + 2 6 = ( − 1)(8 + 2) that is, (18) and (19) no longer hold under population monotonicity. We can easily see that if we switch from a mechanism in Theorem 1b to 1a (i.e. strengthen SALB to IR), then for each  ∈ N and each  ∈ C   the deficit increases by (15), for population monotonic Groves mechanisms, if we strengthen SALB to IPLB, or IPLB to IR, the increase in minimal deficit is at most the number of people times the maximal cost in the economy.
Conclusion
The importance of population monotonicity and welfare bounds is well-established in the fairness literature. Our characterizations in Theorem 1 confirmed that population monotonicity is compatible with the main welfare lower bounds proposed in the literature under the essential requirements of assignment-efficiency and strategy-proofness.
In Section 4.1, Lemma 2 illustrated that for all the welfare lower bounds except for SALB, population monotonicity significantly changed the form of the minimal transfers and increased the minimal guaranteed welfare levels as well as the deficit in each economy. When the inequalities in Lemma 2 hold as equalities, we obtain the characterizations of Groves mechanisms that generate the minimal deficit in each economy among all Groves mechanisms that respect the welfare bounds in Lemma 2. However, the drawback of these mechanisms is that they do not balance the budget. Still, these mechanisms can be characterized by imposing appropriate upper bounds on deficit as Table 1 in Section 4.2 demonstrates.
In Section 4.3, we analyzed the relative strength of welfare bounds and the logical relations between them. In Section 4.4.1, we saw that under the deficit minimization condition, for an economy with  people, when strengthening SALB to IPLB, the increase in total welfare and deficit is (−1) times the increase when strengthening IPLB to IR; and for the single-task case, the latter increase is in between the minimal and the second minimal cost. In Section 4.4.2, we saw that these results don't hold under population monotonicity.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
} Thus,   respects IR, IPLB, SALB, and -fairness. Since for each  0 ⊂  with  ∈  0 , max
For the next proofs, we need the following notation: Let  b  e   denote typical economies associated with the agent sets  b  e    respectively. For each  ∈ N  each  ∈  each  ∈ C  , and each  ∈ {2 3  } let C  be the set of economies that have  number of agents and D  (  ) be the set of all economies obtained by removing the cost functions of any ( − ) number of agents from  − :
For each  ∈ N  each  ∈  each  ∈ C  , and each  ∈ {2 3  }
23 For the calculations in Example 2c, see the working paper version at http://www.adelaide.edu.au/directory/duygu.yengin Thus, Lemma 1 can be rephrased as follows: A Groves mechanism   is population monotonic if and only if for each
Note that population monotonicity doesn't impose any restriction on economies with two agents, so we take  ≥ 3.
As an example, let  = {1 2 3 4} and  ∈ C   Let   be population monotonic. Then, (22) should be true for   and  = 1 That is,
Proof of Theorem 1: Let A = {} (b) Let  ∈ H be as in (5). By inequality (2),   is population monotonic. By Lemma 2b,   satisfies SALB. Conversely, let   satisfy population monotonicity and SALB. For   to generate the minimal deficit in each economy, (9) must hold as an equality in each economy, that is,  is as in (5). ¤
The proof for the rest of the parts is constructive. Let   be a Groves mechanism that generates the minimal deficit in each economy among all Groves mechanisms that satisfy population monotonicity and welfare lower bound X, where X is IR in part (a), IPLB in part (c), and −fairness with  ≥ 2 in part (d).
. ( 2 3 ) (Let  0 be a maximizer of the left-hand-side of (23). Then,  0 is obtained from b  by removing the cost function of an agent with the lowest cost in
For each  ∈  population monotonicity and welfare bound X restrict the minimal value that   ( − ) can take, which we investigate in the rest of the proof.
(a) By (22) and (8), population monotonicity and IR together imply, for each  ∈  and each b  ∈ D 2 (  ),
(note that population monotonicity doesn't impose any restriction on economies with two agents; hence, the only restriction on economies in D 2 (  ) is by IR), and for each  ∈ , each  ∈ {3  } and each b  ∈ D  (  ),
To minimize the deficit, (24) and for  = 3 (25) should hold as an equality. Then, for each  ∈  and each b  ∈ D 3 (  ),
By (26) and (23), for each  ∈  and each b  ∈ D 3 (  ),
Similarly, to minimize the deficit, for  = 4 (25) should hold as an equality. Then, by (23) and (27), for each  ∈  and each b  ∈ D 4 (  ),
By recursive substitution, at each step applying (23) and minimizing the deficit (i.e., (25) holding as an equality for each  ∈ {3  }), we obtain, for each  ∈  , each  ∈ {3  } and each b  ∈ D  (  ),
if and only if b  =  Hence, for  =  we obtain the  function in (4). ¤ (c) By (22) and (11), population monotonicity and IPLB together imply, for each  ∈  and each b  ∈ D 2 (  ),
and for each  ∈ , each  ∈ {3  } and each b  ∈ D  (  ),
To minimize the deficit, (28) and for  = 3 (29) should hold as an equality. Then, for each  ∈  and each b  ∈ D 3 (  ),
By (30) and (23), for each  ∈  and each b  ∈ D 3 (  ),
Similarly, to minimize the deficit, for  = 4 (29) should hold as an equality. Then, by (31) and a similar argument to (23), for each  ∈  and each b  ∈ D 4 (  ),
By recursive substitution, at each step applying (23) and minimizing the deficit (i.e., (29) holding as an equality for each  ∈ {3  }), we obtain, for each  ∈  , each  ∈ {3  } and each b  ∈ D  (  ), (22) and (13), population monotonicity and −fairness together imply, for each  ∈  and each b  ∈ D 2 (  ),
To minimize the deficit, (32) and for  = 3 (33) should hold as an equality. Then, for each  ∈  and each b  ∈ D 3 (  ),
Observation 1: For each  ∈  each  ∈ {2  } and each b  ∈ D  (  ),
for some  ∈ b  \{} That is, we obtain e  − by removing the cost function of one agent from b  −  Hence,
First, suppose (i) holds. That is, an agent whose cost is more than
The second equality follows from Observation 2. ♦ By (34) and Observations 1 and 3, for each  ∈  and each b  ∈ D 3 (  ),
Similarly, to minimize the deficit, for  = 4 (33) should hold as an equality. Then, by (37), for each  ∈  and each b  ∈ D 4 (  ),
Substituting (39) into (38) and applying Observation 3, we get for each  ∈  and each b  ∈ D 4 (  ),
By recursive substitution, at each step applying Observations 1 and 3, and minimizing the deficit (i.e., (33) holding as an equality for each  ∈ {3  }), we obtain, for each  ∈  , each  ∈ {3  } and each 
(b) By Proposition 3a in Yengin (2011b) .
(c) By Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 in Yengin (2011a) .
Proof of the Claim: Let  ∈ N   ∈  , and
By (12) and (41), for each  ∈ N  each  ∈  and each  ∈ C  such that
Conversely, let   respect CIPLB on the domain S ∈N C  . Assume, by contradiction, that there are  ∈ N ,  ∈  , and  ∈ C  such that
, and the fact that b  − =  − together contradict (42).
(e) For 1−fairness note that, on the additive domain, by Theorem 2 and Corollary 3 in Atlamaz and Yengin (2008) , G 1− ≡ G 2− ; and (13) is same as (14) when  = 2 Let  ≥ 2 and  be as in (13). Note that for each  ∈ N , each  ∈  , and each
 Hence, for each  ∈ N , each  ∈ , and each (1) and (13),   is −fair on the additive domain.
Conversely, for some  ≥ 2 let   be −fair on the additive domain. Assume, by contradiction, that there are  ∈ N ,  ∈  and  ∈ C   such that
Since b  − =  −  by (44) and (45),
For the proofs next, note that for each  ∈ N and each 
By (I), (III), and (47),
each  ∈ C    and each  ∈ Θ () ≥ 0;
Conversely, let  ∈ Θ and   be a Groves mechanism that is individually rational and satisfies   -boundeddeficit on the additive domain. Assume, by contradiction, that   is not Pivotal. Then, by (8) (ii) Follows from Remark 1 and Table 1iii when  = 2
(iii) By Theorem 1 in Atlamaz and Yengin (2008) .
(iv) We will prove the statement on any domain. For each  ∈ N and each  ∈ C   let   () = −( − 1) ( A) + () with  ∈ Θ Let     be a mechanism such that (5) holds. By Lemma 2b, it satisfies SALB. Note that for each  ∈ N  each  ∈ C   and each  ∈ Θ () ≥ 0; and by (5) 
Since for each  ∈ N  each  ∈ C   and each  ∈ Π () ≥ 0   satisfies   −bounded deficit.
Conversely, let   be a Groves mechanism that is population monotonic, individually rational, and satisfies   −bounded deficit. By PM and IR, for each  ∈ N  each  ∈ C   and each  ∈    ( 
Since by Case 1 and 2, (b ) = 0 by (50), we get a contradiction. ¥ Proof of Table 2 :
Follows from the fact that for each  ≥ 1 each  ∈ N , each  ∈  and each  ∈ C  , 0 ≥ − Table 3: (i) Note that if  = 2 then for each  ∈ N  min{ } = 2 Hence, the result follows from the fact that on the additive domain, due to (IV), inequalities (11), (13), and (14) are the same for  = 2
(ii) Let C ∈ {C   C  } and  ≥ 2 Let   be a Groves mechanism that respects IPLB on the domain S (iv) Let C ∈ {C   C   C  } The result follows from the fact that for each  ∈ N  each  ∈  and each  ∈ C  , the right-hand-side of inequality (12) is greater than 0.
(v) Follows from (ii) and (iii) . ¥ Proof of Table 5 : Let A = {} (i) See the proof of Table 1i .
(ii) Let   be a mechanism such that in each economy, (11) holds as an equality. Then, for each  ∈ N  each  ∈  and each  ∈ C     ( − ) = 
